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ABSTRACT: This study examines the impact of IFRS adoption on audit fee. We first 
build an analytical audit fee model to develop empirical hypotheses. We then test our 
hypotheses using audit fee data from 14 European Union countries that mandated IFRS 
adoption in 2005. We find that mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit 
fee, which suggests that the increase in audit task complexity associated with IFRS 
adoption is the driving force for the audit fee change. Furthermore, we find that the IFRS-
related audit fee premium increases with the extent of the accounting differences between 
a country’s former local GAAP and IFRS, decreases with the improvement in financial 
reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption, and decreases with the strength of a 
country’s legal regime. These results provide useful insights into the audit fee effect of 
IFRS adoption, and how this effect varies with the institutional features of different 
countries. 
 
Key Words: Audit fee change, IFRS adoption, Audit complexity, Financial reporting 
quality, Legal regime. 
Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Parliament (Regulation No 1606/2002) required companies listed 
on the organized exchanges in European Union (EU) countries to prepare their 
consolidated accounts using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)1 starting 
from January 2005. In the history of accounting regulation, this requirement is the first 
regulation that mandated the same disclosure standards across multiple political 
jurisdictions with different legal and other institutional infrastructures. Since this historic 
event, there has been an increasing trend of adopting IFRS around the world.2  The 
accounting profession and academic researchers have paid great attention to the 
informational and other economic consequence of IFRS adoption. Proponents of IFRS 
claim that the IFRS adoption leads to greater and higher-quality disclosures. They argue 
that when compared with former local GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Standards) 
in most countries, IFRS is more fair-value-oriented, emphasizing more on “true and fair 
view” both in letter and in spirit, and incorporating the effects of economic events on firm 
performance into financial statements in a timelier manner (Coopers & Lybrand 1993; 
Dumontier and Raffounier 1998; GAAP 2000; Alexander and Archer 2001). 
Consistent with the views of the IFRS proponents, some recent research has 
provided empirical evidence suggesting that financial disclosures under IFRS are, in 
general, of higher information quality than those under a country’s local accounting 
                                                 
1 The IAS are standards issued by the International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC), and the IFRS 
are standards issued by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). In 2001, the IASB succeeded 
the IASC to assume its standard-setting responsibilities and adopted all standards issued by the IASC. For 
convenience, this study uses the term IFRS to refer to both IAS and IFRS. 
2 More than 100 countries have required or permitted IFRS for their domestic listed companies. In 2002, 
IASB and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the U.S. embarked on a joint program to 
make U.S. GAAP and IAS fully compatible (known as the “Norwalk Agreement”). 
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standards. This strand of research finds that IFRS-based earnings are of higher value 
relevance than German GAAP-based earnings (Bartov et al. 2005), convey more 
information contents than Swiss GAAP (Auer 1996), improve analysts’ forecast accuracy 
(Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001) and accounting quality (Barth et al. 2005), and reduce stock 
price synchronicity (Kim and Shi 2009a). Besides these informational benefits, another 
strand of research has provided evidence that IFRS adoption leads to some other 
economic benefits, including lower cost of equity capital (Daske et al. 2009; Kim and Shi 
2009b), higher market liquidity and trading volume (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000), more 
investment flows through foreign mutual funds (Covrig et al. 2007), and improved 
efficiency in private debt contracting (Kim et al. 2009). While these studies focus on the 
benefit side of voluntary IFRS adoption, little attention has been paid to the cost side. We 
note that unlike voluntary IFRS adoption, mandatory IFRS adoption is an exogenously 
imposed, regulatory event that necessarily engenders various costs associated therewith. 
To fill this gap, our study aims to offer insights into the cost side of mandatory IFRS 
adoption by examining a hitherto unexplored question of whether and how the EU 
decision to mandate IFRS impacts fees paid to auditors for their financial statement 
audits (henceforth, audit fees).  
Since Simunic (1980), many studies have examined cross-sectional determinants 
of audit fees within a country. These studies find that audit fees are primarily determined 
by client size, potential legal liability or litigation risk, and audit task complexity (e.g., 
Simunic and Stein 1996; Craswell et al. 1995). This study extends the previous single-
country studies to an international setting where the mandatory IFRS adoption by EU 
countries leads to a shift in disclosure regime. This shift in disclosure regime implies not 
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only an upward shift in audit task complexity, but also an upward shift in financial 
reporting quality as claimed by proponents of IFRS (arising from improvement in the 
quality of accounting standards), without any change in legal regime or other institutional 
infrastructures. We take advantage of this unique setting to assess whether and how the 
changes in audit task complexity and financial reporting quality work together to affect 
audit pricing.  
To guide our hypotheses development and interpretation of empirical results, we 
first develop a simple analytical model in which audit task complexity, financial 
reporting quality, and legal regime play critical roles in producing and pricing audit 
services. We then test the model’s predictions on the relation between IFRS adoption and 
audit fee. To shed more lights on the audit fee effect of IFRS adoption, we further test the 
model’s prediction on how the relation between IFRS adoption and audit fee is 
conditioned upon a country’s institutional factors. In so doing, we consider three types of 
institutional factors: (i) the increase in audit complexity arising from IFRS adoption; (ii) 
the improvement in reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption; and (iii) the 
strength of a country’s legal regime. 
 To empirically assess the audit fee impact of the above factors (i) and (ii), we 
rely on the Absence and Divergence scores developed by Ding et al. (2007). The Absence 
score is based on the number of accounting treatments regarding certain accounting 
issues that exist in IFRS, but are missing from former local GAAP. The Divergence score 
is developed by counting the number of the accounting treatments regarding the same 
accounting issues that differ between IFRS and local GAAP. We use 
ln(Absence+Divergence) to measure the accounting differences between local GAAP and 
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IFRS. This measure captures factor (i), i.e., the increase in audit complexity arising from 
IFRS adoption. In addition, we use ln(1 )Absence− + to measure the quality of local 
GAAP in the pre-adoption period, because a higher value of Absence indicates a lower 
degree of GAAP comprehensiveness (relative to IFRS) and Ding et al. find a negative 
association between Absence and accounting quality. As Absence takes the benchmark 
value of zero after IFRS adoption, ln(1 )Absence+  simply captures factor (ii), i.e., the 
improvement in financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption.3 We use the 
litigation risk index developed by Wingate (1997) to measure the third institutional 
factor, i.e., the strength of a country’s legal regime faced by auditors.4 By utilizing these 
scores or indices, our study addresses the question of whether and how cross-country 
differences in these three institutional factors have an impact on the audit fee changes 
associated with IFRS adoption. 
For our empirical tests, we construct a cross-country sample of firms which 
consist of (i) EU firm-year observations that adopted IFRS over the four years after EU’s 
decision to mandate IFRS, i.e., 2005-2008; and (ii) EU firm-year observations that did 
not adopt IFRS over the period of 2002-2008.5 With a large sample of 11,883 firm-year 
observations from 14 EU member countries, we first test whether mandatory IFRS 
adoption causes a change in audit fees, after controlling for other determinants of audit 
fees. We then examine how the observed audit fee change, if any, is associated with the 
three institutional factors; namely, the increase in audit task complexity arising from 
                                                 
3 The improvement in reporting quality from pre-adoption local GAAP to IFRS is 0-[-ln(1+Absence)]= 
ln(1+Absence).  
4 The Wingate (1997) litigation index has been used as a proxy for a country’s litigation risk faced by 
auditors in several studies including Francis et al. (2003), Choi and Wong (2007), and Choi et al. (2008, 
2009).  
5 As explained later, some EU firms are allowed to postpone the adoption of IFRS till after 2005.  
 7
IFRS adoption; the improvement in financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS 
adoption, and the strength of the country’s legal regime.  
 Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that auditors charge 
significantly higher audit fees in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption 
period. 6  This suggests that IFRS adoption entails more complex audit work, which 
dominates the audit-fee reducing effect of an improved financial reporting quality 
brought about by IFRS adoption. Second, we find that the IFRS-related audit fee 
premium (i.e., the increase in audit fee caused by IFRS adoption) is positively related to 
the extent to which IFRS adoption increases audit task complexity. Third, the IFRS-
related audit fee premium decreases with the improvement in GAAP quality 
(comprehensiveness) brought about by IFRS adoption. Finally, the IFRS-related audit fee 
premium decreases with the strength of a country’s legal regime. This finding suggests 
that the greater audit effort induced by a stronger legal regime has a dominant effect on 
reducing the audit fee premium, compared with the direct impact of the stronger legal 
regime on increasing the audit fee premium. This finding highlights the benefit of a 
stronger legal regime in the context of IFRS adoption: The greater audit effort induced by 
a stronger legal regime could actually reduce the IFRS-related audit fee premium. 
Our study adds to the extant literature in the following ways. First, our study is 
one of the few studies, if not the first, that examine the cost side of IFRS adoption with a 
focus on audit fee. Existing studies on IFRS are typically concerned with various 
economic benefits of IFRS adoption (e.g., Bartov et al. 2005; Auer 1996; Ashbaugh and 
Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 2005; Covrig et al. 2007; Kim et al. 2009a, b), or the 
                                                 
6  Unless otherwise specified, in this paper the term “post-adoption period (years)” include both the 
adoption year and the years subsequent to the adoption year. 
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determinants of a firm’s decision to adopt IFRS (Cuijpers and Buijink 2005; Dumontier 
and Raffounier 1998; Hope et al. 2006). While Dumontier and Raffounier (1998, 239) 
mentioned in their study that “compliance with IAS is particularly costly since it implies 
additional disclosure and renunciation of considerable discretion in accounting practices,” 
previous research has paid little attention to the costs of adopting IFRS.  
Second, this study contributes to the audit pricing literature. Our study shares 
some similarity with Choi et al. (2009) in the sense that both cross-listing and IFRS 
adoption are associated with enhanced disclosures. In their study, a cross-listing has two 
effects, i.e., upward shifts in legal regime and in disclosure requirements, both of which 
may increase audit fee. In contrast, in our study, IFRS adoption involves two 
contradicting effects on audit fee: upward shift in audit complexity increases audit fee, 
but improvement in financial reporting quality reduces audit fee. By examining these two 
effects separately, we provide insights into how audit complexity and financial reporting 
quality can have different effects on audit fee.  
 Finally, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that provides 
systematic evidence on the impact of accounting standards on audit pricing. When 
evaluating the change in audit fee resulting from IFRS adoption, we weigh two factors: 
the auditing benefit of IFRS (i.e., improved financial reporting quality) against the 
auditing cost of IFRS (i.e., increased audit complexity). Our empirical results from 
pooled regressions show that the audit fees increase with IFRS adoption, which suggests 
that the latter cost factor tends to dominate the former benefit factor in the context of their 
joint effects on audit fee.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a 
theoretical audit fee model and formulates empirical hypotheses based on the model’s 
predictions. Section 3 specifies empirical models for hypothesis testing. Section 4 
describes our sample and data sources, and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 
reports our main empirical results for hypothesis testing. Section 6 shows further 
sensitivity analyses. The final section concludes the paper. All proofs appear in Appendix. 
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
To gain insights into the effect of IFRS on audit fee, we build an audit fee model, 
which is similar in spirit to the model of Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic (CKLS: 2008, 
2009). The auditor’s objective is to choose the audit effort, (0,1)e∈ , to minimize the 
total audit cost, which is the sum of two components – the expected legal liability cost 
and the auditor’s effort cost: 
2
(0,1)
Minimize Total-Audit-Cost = (1 )[ (1 )][ (1 )] .
e
q c e r e l ke
∈
− − − +  (1)  
where 
(0,1)q∈  denotes the quality of financial reporting, which is represented by the 
probability of the financial statement containing no misstatement or 
misrepresentation of the firm’s economic situation; 
 
(0,1)c∈  refers to the complexity of an audit; 
(0,1)e∈  represents the auditor’s effort;  
(0,1)r∈ refers to the strength of the country’s legal environment in determining 
the auditor’s legal liability conditional on an audit failure;  
 
0l >  refers to the amount of legal payment the auditor makes to the client if the 
auditor is found liable in court; and 
 
0k >  is the auditor’s effort cost parameter. 
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 First, note that (1 )c e−  in the objective function (1) represents the probability of 
an audit failure (i.e., the probability of the auditor issuing an unqualified opinion on a 
misstated report), which is increasing in audit complexity c and decreasing in the 
auditor’s effort e. Also note that (1 )r e−  is the probability of the auditor being held liable 
in court in the event of audit failure, which is increasing in the strength of the country’s 
legal regime r and decreasing in the auditor’s effort e. Hence, (1 )[ (1 )][ (1 )]q c e r e l− − −  as 
a whole represents the auditor’s expected legal liability associated with a financial 
statement audit. Finally, 2ke  is the auditor’s effort cost, which is increasing and convex 
in effort e. 
 The objective function (1) is convex in audit effort. We can derive from the first 
order condition the optimal audit effort: e∗  = (1 )(1 )
q crl
q crl k
−
− + .  We know from 0
e
r
∗∂ >∂  and 
0e
c
∗∂ >∂  that the auditor’s effort choice is increasing in both the strength of the legal 
regime and the complexity of the audit.  
 In a competitive audit market, the audit fee is equal to the total audit cost in 
equilibrium, that is, 2 2(1 ) (1 )f q rc e l ke∗ ∗= − − + . As * 2(1 ) (1 ) 0f q c e l
r
∂ = − − >∂ , 
* 2(1 ) (1 ) 0f q r e l
c
∂ = − − >∂ , and 
* 2(1 ) 0f rc e l
q
∂ = − − <∂ , we have the following results. 
 
Observation 1: The audit fee is increasing in the strength of legal regime r and in 
audit complexity c, but decreasing in financial reporting quality q.  
  
 One of the results in Observation 1 is that audit fee decreases with the quality of 
financial reporting. The intuition behind this result is clear: The higher the quality of a 
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financial report, the less likely the financial report contains any misstatement or 
misrepresentation of the firm’s economic situation. As a result, the auditor faces less 
expected legal liability, which leads to a lower audit fee.  
 To examine how the IFRS adoption changes audit fee, we note that IFRS adoption 
has two audit-related effects. First, it improves financial reporting quality, as IFRS are 
generally considered better accounting standards than (former) local accounting standards. 
Second, IFRS adoption increases the complexity of an audit. As IFRS are comprehensive, 
fair-value oriented, and principle-based, the use of IFRS generally requires accountants 
and auditors to perform more complex estimates and use more professional judgments 
(Deloitte 2008; Mersereau 2006). As shown in Observation 1, on the one hand, the 
improvement of financial reporting quality reduces audit fee; on the other hand, the 
increase in audit complexity increases audit fee. Therefore, the effect of IFRS adoption 
on audit fee is determined by which of the above two forces dominates. Our analysis 
yields the following result. 
 
Observation 2: IFRS adoption, which increases both financial reporting quality 
and audit complexity, leads to an increase (decrease) in audit fee, if the positive 
effect of the increase in audit complexity dominates (is dominated by) the 
negative effect of improved financial reporting quality on audit fee. Specifically, 
IFRS adoption is likely to lead to a higher (lower) audit fee if (1 )q c c q− Δ > Δ  
(if qccq Δ<Δ− )1（ ), where Δ  denotes the change that is brought about by the 
IFRS adoption. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
As the condition stated in Observation 2 is a priori unknown, we formulate the following 
null hypothesis on the relation between IFRS adoption and audit fee. 
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H1: IFRS adoption has no impact on audit fee.  
  
 IFRS-adoption could lead to an increase or decrease in audit fee, depending on 
whether the increase in audit complexity or the increase in financial reporting quality is 
the dominant factor in determining the audit fee change. To facilitate the later discussion, 
we provide a preview on the results of empirical test for H1. The results as reported in 
Table 6 show that IFRS-adoption leads to a positive audit fee change. According to 
Observation 2, these empirical results suggest that (1 )q c c q− Δ > Δ holds, i.e., the positive 
effect of the increase in audit complexity dominates the negative effect of improved 
financial reporting quality on audit fee. Throughout the paper, we conveniently refer to 
the positive audit fee change induced by IFRS-adoption as “audit fee premium.” 
 The increase in audit complexity that results from IFRS adoption may have two 
components: (i) the temporary increase which is due to the learning curve of the auditors; 
and (ii) the permanent increase which is due to the inherently more complex audit 
judgment required by IFRS compared with former local GAAP. The temporary increase 
in audit complexity means that the auditor takes time and effort to learn about new IFRS 
rules, but this learning effect is likely to become insignificant after the first year of IFRS 
adoption. We thus form the following hypothesis in alternative form.  
 
H2: The audit fee premium in the years subsequent to the adoption year is smaller 
than that in the adoption year.  
 
 
 We now examine how the audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption 
varies with a number of institutional factors. First, we examine the effects of the 
increased audit complexity arising from IFRS adoption. We derive that 
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0)],(),([ >Δ∂
−Δ+∂=Δ∂
Δ∂
c
cqfccqf
c
f iiiIFRS , where the subscript i is country-specific. This 
means that, other things being equal, the greater the increase in audit complexity (i.e., 
greater cΔ ), the greater the IFRS-related audit fee premium.   
 
Observation 3: The audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption is 
increasing with the increase in audit complexity arising from IFRS adoption.  
  
 We also note that the greater the differences in accounting rules between the local 
GAAP and the IFRS, the greater the increase in audit complexity associated with IFRS 
adoption. Based upon the prediction in Observation 3, we test the following hypothesis in 
alternative form. 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption is 
greater in countries with more differences between the pre-adoption local GAAP 
and IFRS than in countries with fewer differences between the two. 
  
 Next, we examine how the IFRS-related audit fee premium changes with the 
improvement in financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption. We derive 
that [ ( , ) ( , )] 0i IFRS i if q q c f q cf
q q
∂ + Δ −∂Δ = <∂Δ ∂Δ . This means that, other things being equal, 
the lower the pre-adoption financial reporting quality, the greater the improvement in 
financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption (i.e., greater Δq), hence the 
lower the audit fee premium.  
 
Observation 4: The audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption is 
decreasing with the improvement in financial reporting quality brought about by 
IFRS adoption. 
 
Based upon the prediction in Observation 4, we test the following hypothesis in 
alternative form. 
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H4: Ceteris paribus, the audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption is 
decreasing with the improvement in financial reporting quality brought about by 
IFRS adoption.  
  
 Finally, we examine how the audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption 
varies with a country’s legal regime. In this analysis, we assume that  (1 )q c c q− Δ > Δ , 
which is a reasonable assumption because we observe a positive audit fee change after 
IFRS adoption (see the discussion following H1). We derive that 
e e
df df df e
r r e r∗=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . The first component is e e
df
r ∗=
∂
∂ > 0, which  represents the 
direct positive effect of a stronger legal regime on the audit fee premium, with effort level 
being fixed. The second component is df e
e r
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ , which represents the negative effect of a 
greater auditor effort on audit fee premium ( df
e
∂
∂ <0 ) times the positive effect of a 
stronger legal regime on auditor effort (denoted by e
r
∂
∂ >0 ). Hence, effect of the legal 
regime on the IFRS-related audit fee premium, i.e., the sign of df
r
∂
∂ , depends on which of 
the above two components is dominant. For example, when the second component is 
larger in magnitude, that means that the greater auditor effort induced by the legal regime 
has a more significant reduction effect on the audit fee premium, compared with the 
direct increasing effect of the stronger legal regime on the audit fee premium (with effort 
level being fixed). This leads to an overall reduction in the IFRS-related audit fee 
premium in a stronger legal regime. Our analysis shows that 
e e
df df e
r e r∗=
∂ ∂ ∂<∂ ∂ ∂  holds 
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when the strength of the legal regime exceeds a threshold. Specifically, we have the 
following result. 
 
Observation 5: Assume that (1 )q c c q− Δ > Δ holds. The audit fee premium 
associated with IFRS adoption decreases (increases) with the strength of a 
country’s legal regime if the positive effect of a stronger legal regime on the 
auditor’s effort is sufficiently large (small). Specifically, df
r
∂
∂  < 0 (
df
r
∂
∂ >0 ) when 
the strength of the legal regime exceeds (falls below) a threshold, i.e., 
)1( qcl
kr −>  ( (1 )
kr
cl q
< − ).  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Based on Observation 5, we formulate the following hypothesis in null form:  
 
H5: The audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption is the same for 
countries with strong legal regimes as for countries with weak legal regimes.  
 
   
III. EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES 
 
Research Design for Testing H1 and H2 
H1 is related to the overall effect of IFRS adoption on audit fee. On the one hand, 
IFRS adoption increases audit complexity, and thus increases audit fee; on the other hand, 
IFRS adoption increases financial reporting quality, and thus reduces audit fee. As the 
two effects work in the opposite direction, it is an empirical question as for which effect 
dominates. H2 predicts a lower audit fee in the years subsequent to the adoption year than 
in the adoption year as long as the increased audit complexity brought about by IFRS 
adoption has some temporary fee-increasing effect due to the auditor’s learning curve. 
To test H1 and H2, we estimate the following regression model, using the full 
sample covering the period of 2002-2008. 
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0 1 2
1
_
.
k
k
AUDFEE ADOPT POST ADOPT FSCONTROL
Country Indicators Error Term
β β β δ
=
= + + +
+ +
∑  (2) 
In Eq. (2), ADOPT is an indicator variable that equals one for the year of IFRS adoption 
and years subsequent to the year of IFRS adoption, and zero otherwise. POST_ADOPT 
equals one for only the years subsequent to the year of IFRS adoption, and zero 
otherwise. FSCONTROL denotes firm-specific control variables. Table 1 provides the 
definitions of all the variables included in Eq. (1).   
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
We include nine firm-specific controls (LNTA, INVREC, LOSS, LEV, QUICK, 
NBS, NGS, BIG4 and CROSS). LNTA and INVREC are proxies for client size and client 
complexity, respectively (e.g., Simunic 1980; Francis 1984). As operationally or 
geographically diversified firms may require more complex audits, we include the 
number of business segment (NBS) and the number of geographical segment (NGS) as 
additional proxies for client complexity (Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008). Similar to 
Simunic (1980), Francis (1984), and Seetharaman et al. (2002), we include LOSS, LEV, 
and QUICK to measure the client-specific litigation risks to be borne by auditors. We 
expect the coefficients on all the above firm-specific control variables except QUICK to 
be positive as prior studies show that audit fees are positively related to client size, client 
complexity, and client-specific risk factors. We expect the coefficient on QUICK to be 
negative, as a low QUICK ratio is associated with a higher financial risk (Francis 1984). 
We also include the Big 4 indicator variable (BIG4) to capture a Big 4 auditor fee 
premium (e.g., DeFond et al. 2000; Choi et al. 2008). Finally, Choi et al. (2009) find that 
auditors charge higher fees for firms that are cross-listed in countries with stronger legal 
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regimes than they do for non-cross-listed firms. We control for any cross-listing effect on 
audit fee by including an indicator variable, CROSS, which equals one for cross-listed 
firms and zero otherwise. We use country indicators in the regression to control for 
correlated omitted variables associated with country-level fee determinants.  
 The coefficient β1 captures the audit fee premium associated with the first year of 
IFRS adoption, whereas the sum of two coefficients, β1+ β2, captures the audit fee 
premium in the years subsequent to the first adoption year.  β2 captures the learning 
effect, i.e., the audit fee differential between the IFRS adoption year and the subsequent 
post-adoption years.7  H2 translates as 2 0β < .  
 
Research Design for Testing H3, H4, and H5 
 To test the impact of the institutional factors on the audit fee premium associated 
with IFRS adoption, we estimate the following model using the full sample covering the 
period of 2002-2008. 
0 1 2
3 4
9
1
*
* *
.k
k
AUDFEE ADOPT ADOPT GAAPDIFF
ADOPT GAAPQUALITY ADOPT REGIME
FSCONTROL Country Indicators Error Term
β β β
β β
δ
=
= + +
+ Δ +
+ + +∑
 (3) 
 In Eq. (3), GAAPDIFF measures the extent to which local GAAP deviates from 
IFRS. This measure captures the increase in audit complexity arising from IFRS 
adoption. GAAPDIFF is constructed based on the Absence and Divergence scores 
developed by Ding et al. (2007). The Absence score is based on the number of accounting 
rules regarding certain accounting issues that are missing in (pre-adoption) local GAAP 
                                                 
7 Other than the learning effect, there may be other reasons that contribute to a temporary increase in audit 
complexity in the adoption year. For example, if a firm first adopts IFRS in 2005, then for 2005 the 
company has to publish not only its financial statements for 2005 using IFRS but also the figures for 2004 
that are restated according to IFRS (JeanJean and Stolowy 2008). 
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but are explicitly stipulated in IFRS. The Divergence score is based on the number of 
accounting rules regarding the same accounting issues that differ between IFRS and (pre-
adoption) local GAAP. As both Absence and Divergence contribute to the difference in 
accounting standards, GAAPDIFF is computed as the natural log of the sum of the 
Absence and Divergence scores, i.e., ln(Absence+Divergence). H3 states that the audit fee 
premium associated with IFRS adoption is increasing with the accounting differences 
between IFRS and the pre-adoption local GAAP, which implies that the coefficient on 
ADOPT*GAAPDIFF is positive, i.e., 2β > 0.   
 GAAPQUALITYΔ refers to the change (improvement) in the quality of 
accounting standards that is brought about by IFRS adoption. We use the 
ln(1 )Absence− +  to proxy for the former local GAAP quality, as Absence is inversely 
associated with the degree of (pre-adoption) local GAAP comprehensiveness.8 Ding et al. 
(2007) find that Absence is negatively correlated with financial reporting quality. More 
specifically, they find that a higher level of Absence implies more opportunities for 
earnings management and less firm-specific information for investors. GAAP quality 
after IFRS adoption is the same across adopting countries and takes a benchmark value of 
zero (as Absence becomes zero). Hence, the improvement in GAAP quality brought about 
by IFRS adoption, namely GAAPQUALITYΔ , equals 
0 [ ln(1 )] ln(1 )Absence Absence− − + = + . H4 implies that the coefficient on 
GAAPQUALITYΔ is negative, i.e.,  β3  < 0.  
                                                 
8 Ding et al. (2007) find that financial reporting quality is negatively associated with the Absence score, but 
not the Divergence score. Appendix A in Ding et al. (2007) provides details of the measurement of Absence 
and Divergence. The primary source for the score construction is “GAAP 2001: A Survey of national 
accounting rules benchmarked against International Accounting Standards” by Nobes (2001).  
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 The impact of legal regime on the IFRS-related audit fee premium, which is 
captured by the coefficient β4, depends on two forces. On the one hand, in a stronger 
legal regime, the greater auditor effort induced by the stronger legal regime has a 
significant negative effect on the audit fee premium; on the other hand, there is a direct 
positive effect of the stronger legal regime on the audit fee premium with effort level 
being fixed. Our empirical investigation into β4 will shed light on which of the above two 
effects dominates. 
 
IV. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We initially identify a sample of 31,782 firm-year observations from 14 EU 
countries over the period of 2002-2008 from Worldscope.9 To test our hypotheses, we 
further exclude (1) firms with missing or ambiguous information on accounting 
standards ; (2) firms that adopted IFRS voluntarily (i.e., firms that adopted IFRS prior to 
2005);10 (3) firms that pertain to the banking, insurance, and other financial industries 
(with the Worldscope general industry classification of 04, 05 or 06); (4) firms with 
missing audit fee data; and (5) firms with missing data required to compute other firm-
specific control variables. As shown in Table 2, we obtain the final sample of 11,883 
firm-year observations for 14 EU countries after applying the above selection criteria.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
                                                 
9 Luxembourg is excluded due to missing legal regime information as well as the information on ABSENCE 
and DIVERGENCE scores developed by Ding et al. (2007).  
10 We focus on the audit fee implications of mandatory change of financial standards and exclude firms that 
voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 2005. The benefit of studying mandatory adoption is that the audit fee 
implication is not subject to the self selection issue. As firms voluntarily adopt IFRS only when the benefits 
of adoption overweight the costs of adoption, the audit fee changes of voluntary adopters may not be 
generalized to the general population. 
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Worldscope has a data field 07536 that describes accounting standards followed 
by a specific firm. This data field includes the following 16 categories: (1) IFRS; (2) 
International standards; (3) International standards and some EEC guidelines; (4) Local 
standards; (5) Local standards with EEC and IASC guidelines; (6) Local standards with a 
certain reclassification for foreigners; (7) Local standards with some EEC guidelines; (8) 
Local standards with some IASC guidelines; (9) Local standards with some OECD 
guidelines; (10) NA; (11) Not disclosed; (12) Other; (13) Specific standards set by the 
group; (14) US GAAP reclassified from local standards; (15) US standards (GAAP); and 
(16) US standards inconsistency problems. Similar to JeanJean and Stolowy (2008), we 
code the standards as IFRS if 07356 = 01, and code the standard as local GAAP if 07356 
= 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, or 09.11 We consider the year as the (first) year of adoption if the 
accounting standards are coded as IFRS in the year but coded as local GAAP for the 
previous years.  
Regulation No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament mandated publicly listed 
firms in EU countries to adopt IFRS, effective January 1, 2005, but also allow the 
following firms to postpone the IFRS adoption. (1) firms listed on less regulated markets 
(e.g., the Alternative Investment Market [AIM] in London);12 (2) firms reporting non-
consolidated reports; (3) firms publicly traded in a non-EU country which use 
internationally accepted standards; and (4) firms with only publicly traded debt securities. 
As a result, not all publicly listed firms in EU adopted IFRS in 2005.  
                                                 
11 Following JeanJean and Stolowy (2008), we do not consider categories (2) and (3) as equivalent to (1) 
because of the ambiguity over the content of the categories. However, treating (2) and (3) as equivalent to 
(1) does not change our results as there are only a few observations in these two categories. We exclude 
observations falling in categories (10) to (16).  
12 Note that about half of the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange are AIM listed firms (e.g., 47.8% 
in 2009 according to the London Stock Exchange website). 
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Table 3 reports the distribution of IFRS adoption over the period of 2005-2008 
across 14 EU countries. The statistics are based on our sample before imposing the non-
missing data requirements for audit fee and firm-specific control variables. As shown in 
Table 3, the adoption of IFRS in 2005 varies across countries, with the lowest percentage 
of adoption in UK (25%), followed by Ireland (47%). By the end of 2008, almost all EU 
publicly listed firms had adopted IFRS.  
 [INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE!] 
Table 4 presents the mean values of the variables included in Eq. (2) for each 
country and the grand mean for the 14 EU countries in our sample. We also include 
Absence and Divergence scores, which are used for constructing GAAPDIFF and 
ΔGAAPQUALITY in Eq. (3). The number of observations varies across countries with 
only 4 observations in Greece and 7,571 observations in UK. The Absence and 
Divergence scores that are used for the construction of our key test variables 
ΔGAAPQUALITY and GAAPDIFF vary significantly across our sample countries. This 
provides a reasonable cross-country setting to assess the impact of these country-level 
variables on audit fee.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE!] 
Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients and their p-values (in 
parentheses) for the variables used in our regression analysis. Consistent with prior 
studies, audit fee (AUDFEE) is highly correlated with firm size (LNTA) with the 
correlation coefficient of 0.85. AUDFEE is significantly and positively correlated with 
ADOPT and POST_ADOPT, which suggests that IFRS adoption is associated with an 
increase in audit fee (or IFRS-adoption related audit fee premium). A few firm-specific 
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variables are also highly correlated with each other. For example, the correlation between 
LNTA and BIG4 (LOSS) is 0.52 (-0.45). The high correlation among firm-specific 
variables suggests that it is important to control for such correlated variables when 
making inferences on the relation between audit fee and a particular firm-specific 
variable.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE!] 
 
V. REGRESSION RESULTS 
Throughout the paper, all of the t-values from regressions have been adjusted 
using robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level. All of the 
regressions are estimated after removing outliers with absolute studentized residuals 
greater than 3. As a result, the actual sample size varies slightly across the regressions.  
Table 6 reports the regression results for Eq. (2) for testing H1 and H2. The 
coefficient on ADOPT (i.e., β1) , which captures the IFRS adoption related audit fee 
premium in the (first) year of adoption, is highly significant with a positive sign (0.139 
with t = 8.97). This rejects the null hypothesis H1 in favor of a significant increase in 
audit fee in the year of IFRS adoption.13  
Consistent with H2, the coefficient on POST_ADOPT (i.e., β2), which captures 
the difference in audit fee premium between the adoption year and the subsequent post-
adoption years, is significantly negative (-0.056 with t = -3.49). We also find that the sum 
of β1 and  β2, which captures the audit fee premiums in the post-adoption period, is 
significantly positive (F=26.56), although it is smaller than the first adoption year fee 
                                                 
13 We also run country by country regressions for Eq. (2) and find that only firms in Demark exhibit 
negative IFRS-related fee change at a 10% significance level.  Our results in this study are robust to the 
alternative tests excluding firms from Denmark. 
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premium ( 0 < (β1 + β2 ) < β1).  The audit fee premiums associated with IFRS adoption 
are also economically significant. For example, the results translate into an increase of 
audit fee of 14.9% in the adoption year (and 8.7% in the years subsequent to the adoption 
year) for an average firm when all of the control variables are set at their mean values.  
The above results are in line with the following view. IFRS adoption increases 
audit fee to a higher level both in the year of adoption and in the subsequent years. In 
other words, the IFRS adoption results in an audit fee premium. This suggests that the 
audit fee-increasing effect of the increased complexity arising from IFRS adoption 
dominates the audit fee-decreasing effect of the improved financial reporting quality. 
Moreover, the lower audit fee premium in the years subsequent to the adoption year 
relative to the fee premium in the adoption year supports our hypothesis H2 regarding the 
auditor’s learning curve. These results suggest that the increase in audit task complexity 
caused by IFRS adoption consists of both a temporary component and a permanent 
component.  
 [INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE!] 
To test hypotheses H3-H5, we estimate Eq. (3) using the full sample over the 
period of 2002-2008.  The main results are reported in column 1 of Table 7. We find that 
the coefficient on ADOPT*GAAPDIFF is significantly positive (0.844 with t = 3.39). 
This is consistent H3, i.e., IFRS adoption causes an increase in audit fee to a greater 
extent when a country’s pre-adoption local GAAP deviates more from IFRS. The finding 
suggests that the IFRS-related fee premium is increasing with the increase in audit 
complexity brought about by IFRS adoption in any particular country. 
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The coefficient on ADOPT*ΔGAAPQUALITY is significantly negative (-0.201 
with t = -3.58). This result is consistent with H4, suggesting that, other things being equal, 
the greater the improvement in GAAP quality brought about by IFRS adoption, the lower 
the audit fee premium associated with the IFRS adoption.  
Finally, the coefficient on ADOPT*REGIME is significantly negative (-0.445 
with t = -2.70), which leads us to reject the null hypothesis H5. This result indicates that 
the adoption of IFRS results in a smaller IFRS-related audit fee premium in countries 
with a strong legal regime, compared with the fee premium in countries with a weak legal 
regime. According to Observation 5, this result suggests that the negative audit-fee-
premium effect of greater auditor effort induced by a stronger legal regime is the 
dominant force. Specifically, the auditor exercises greater effort in countries with 
stronger legal regimes (to minimize expected legal liability cost or litigation risk). When 
the positive incentive effect of legal regime on the auditor’s effort is sufficiently large, 
then the IFRS-related audit fee premium decreases with the strength of the legal regime 
(see Observation 5). 
 [INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE!] 
. 
VI. FURTHER ANALYSES 
Nonlinear Relation Between Audit Fee and the Strength of Legal Regime 
In column 1 of Table 7, we implicitly assume that the IFRS-related audit fee 
premiums are linearly associated with the strength of legal regime. Observation 5 
indicates, however, that the inverse relation between IFRS adoption and the associated 
audit fee premium exists only when the strength of legal regime is above a threshold level, 
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suggesting that the relation between the two is nonlinear. To see if our test results 
reported in column 1 of Table 7 are unduly influenced by the linearity assumption, we re-
estimate Eq. (3) without making any assumption on the specific form of the relation 
between legal regime and audit fee premium.  
For countries included in our sample, raw scores on legal regime (i.e., the 
Wingate litigation risk indices) take four values, i.e., 3.61, 4.82, 6.22, and 10. We create 
four regime indicators with each representing one level of the score: REGIME1 = 1 if the 
raw legal regime score is 3.61 and 0 otherwise; REGIME2 = 1 if the raw legal regime 
score is 4.82 and 0 otherwise; REGIME3 = 1 if the raw legal regime score = 6.22 and 0 
otherwise; REGIME4 = 1 if raw legal regime score is 10 and 0 otherwise. We then 
estimate Eq. (3) after replacing REGIME by three indicators, namely REGIME2, 
REGIME3, and REGIME4. Here, the lowest legal regime indicator, REGIME1, serves as 
the benchmark and thus is not included in the regression. The three included legal regime 
indicators capture the incremental difference in the audit fee premium across different 
legal regimes.  
We report the new estimates in column 2 of Table 7. We find that, similar to the 
results in column 1, the coefficient on ADOPT*GAAPDIFF in column 2 is significant 
with a positive sign and the coefficient on ADOPT*ΔGAAPQUALITY is significant with 
a negative sign. More interestingly, we find that the coefficients on ADOPT*REGIME2 
and ADOPT*REGIME3 are not significant whereas the coefficient on 
ADOPT*REGIME4 is significantly negative at the 1% level. These results are consistent 
with our theory (Observation 5) that the audit fee premium associated with IFRS 
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adoption decreases with the strength of a country’s legal regime only when the strength 
of legal regime is above a certain threshold level.  
 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Procedures 
As the OLS results may be unduly influenced by the unequal size of the samples 
from different countries, we also perform sensitivity tests using the WLS procedure with 
an equal weight assigned to each country. The results from WLS procedures are 
qualitatively similar to the results in Tables 6 and 7. In addition, we exclude the large size 
of UK firms from our sample and rerun the tests. We find that the positive coefficient on 
ADOPT*REGIME becomes marginally significant with this reduced sample (which is 
reasonable as UK has the largest REGIME score in the original sample), and other results 
regarding our test variables remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
Change Analyses 
 Our analyses have focused on pooled cross-sectional regressions of audit fee on 
our test variables (ADOPT, GAAPDIFF, ΔGAAPQUALITY, and REGIME), firm-specific 
controls, and country indicators. To the extent that we fail to control for some other 
variables that are correlated with both audit fee and our test variables, however, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that our results are driven by correlated omitted variables. 
To alleviate this concern, we conduct change analyses to further examine whether the 
IFRS-related audit fee premium is associated with changes in firm-specific controls and 
with our test variables. Specifically, we compare the audit fee before and after the IFRS 
adoption, and then examine whether the audit fee change (or the IFRS-related audit fee 
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premium) varies systematically with our test variables, GAAPDIFF, ΔGAAPQUALITY, 
and REGIME, after controlling for changes in firm-specific controls over the two periods.  
For our change regressions, we construct a reduced sample by including only such 
firms that appear in both the pre-adoption period and the post-adoption period. For each 
firm included in the reduced sample, we compute the average values of audit fee 
(AUDFEE) and firm-specific control variables (i.e., LNTA, INVREC, LEV, and QUICK), 
separately, for the pre-adoption period and the post-adoption period. We then compute 
the change of each variable over the two periods. Since LOSS is an indicator variable, 
ΔLOSS takes value of 1 if, for a particular firm, the magnitude of loss in the post-
adoption period is greater than that in the pre-adoption period. We view the changes in 
firm-specific control variables as zero if their average values do not change from the pre-
adoption period to the post-adoption period.   
In column 1 of Table 8, we report the results of a baseline regression of the 
change in audit fee (ΔAUDFEE) on the changes in firm-specific variables without 
including the test variables. Note here that the intercept is significantly positive (0.114 
with t = 6.80). This suggests that audit fee increases significantly from the pre-adoption 
period to the post-adoption period, even after controlling for changes in all firm-specific 
variables over the two periods. In column 2 of Table 8, we add our test variables, 
GAAPDIFF, ΔGAAPQUALITY, and REGIME, to our baseline change regression to see if 
the audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption varies systematically with these test 
variables.  
As shown in column 2 of Table 8, the coefficient on GAAPDIFF is significantly 
positive (0.809 with t = 4.11). This result buttresses our earlier findings  reported in Table 
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7 in relation to H3, suggesting that the audit fee premium associated with IFRS adoption 
increases with the difference in accounting rules between (pre-adoption) local GAAP and 
IFRS. The coefficient on ΔGAAPQUALITY is significantly negative, which is consistent 
with H4. This finding lends further support to our theory that the improvement in 
financial reporting quality brought about by the IFRS adoption reduces audit fee. Finally, 
the coefficient on REGIME is significantly negative (-0.5 with t = -3.77).  
The results in column 3 of Table 8 are also consistent with those in column 2 of 
Table 7. Overall, the results of our changes-based regressions in Table 8 are in line with 
the results of our levels-based regressions reported in Table 7, suggesting that our test 
results reported earlier are unlikely to be driven by correlated omitted variables.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE!] 
 
VII. SUMMARY 
We investigate the impact of IFRS on audit fee using audit fee data from EU 
countries that mandate IFRS adoption in 2005. Our theoretical analysis suggests that 
IFRS adoption has two opposite effects on audit fee. On the one hand, the increase in 
audit task complexity arising from IFRS adoption increases audit fee; on the other hand, 
the improvement in financial reporting quality has a reduction effect on audit fee. Our 
empirical tests show that the mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit fee, 
which suggests that the increase in audit task complexity is the driving force for the 
IFRS-related audit fee change. Furthermore, we find that the IFRS-related audit fee 
premium increases with the extent of the accounting differences between a country’s 
former local GAAP and IFRS, decreases with the improvement in financial reporting 
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quality brought about by IFRS adoption, and decreases with the strength of a country’s 
legal regime. These results provide insights into the audit fee impact of IFRS adoption, 
and how this effect varies with the institutional features of different countries. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Observation 2 
* 2(1 ) [(1 ) ].f ff df q c e rl q c c q
q c
∂ ∂Δ ≈ = Δ + Δ = − − Δ − Δ∂ ∂  Thus, df > 0 (df < 0) if 
(1 )q c c q− Δ > Δ  (if qccq Δ<Δ− )1（ ), where cΔ  and qΔ  denote the changes in audit 
complexity and financial reporting quality that are brought about by the IFRS adoption. █ 
 
 
Proof of Observation 5 
(1 ) [(1 ) ][ (1 ) ].
e e
df df df e
r r e r
e l q c c q k q rcl
∗=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − − Δ − Δ − −
 
Hence, given that (1 )q c c q− Δ > Δ , we know from the above derivation that df
r
∂
∂  < 0 
( df
r
∂
∂ >0 ) when )1( qcl
kr −>  ( (1 )
kr
cl q
< − ).█ 
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TABLE 1: Empirical Definition of Variables 
Variable  Empirical Definition Data Source 
 
The dependent variable and test variables for firm i in country j in year t 
AUDFEE ijt = natural log of audit fee in thousands of Euros; 
 
Worldscope 
ADOPT ijt = one for the year of IFRS adoption and the years subsequent to 
the year of IFRS adoption, and zero otherwise; 
Worldscope 
    
POST_ADOPTijt = One for only the years subsequent to the year of IFRS adoption, 
and zero otherwise; 
 
Worldscope 
ΔGAAPQUALITYjt = Change in GAAP quality brought about by IFRS adoption, 
measured by the natural log of one plus the Absence score where 
the Absence score captures the number of absent items in local 
GAAP compared with IFRS.  
 
Ding et al. 
(2007) 
GAAPDIFFj = Differences between local GAAP and IFRS, measured by the 
natural log of the sum of Absence and Divergence scores. 
 
Ding et al. 
(2007) 
 
Firm-specific control variables (FSCONTROL) for firm i in country j in year t 
LNTAijt = natural log of year-end total assets in thousands of Euros; 
 
Worldscope 
INVRECijt = the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets; 
 
Worldscope 
LOSSijt = one when a firm reports a net loss in year t and zero otherwise;  
 
Worldscope 
LEVijt = the ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets; 
 
Worldscope 
QUICKijt = quick ratio, being equal to the quick assets divided by current 
liabilities; 
 
Worldscope 
NBSijt = natural log of one plus the number of business segments; 
 
Worldscope 
NGSijt = natural log of one plus the number of geographical segments; 
 
Worldscope 
BIG4ijt = one when a firm uses one of the Big 4 auditors and zero 
otherwise; 
 
Worldscope 
CROSSijt = one when a firm is cross-listed in a foreign country and zero 
otherwise. 
Worldscope 
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    Table 2: Sample Selection 
 
 
Initial sample of 14 EU countries from Worldscope, 2002 – 2008 31,782 
Minus firms with missing or ambiguous information on accounting 
standard  
(1,142) 
 30,640 
Minus voluntary adopters (3,264) 
 27,376 
Minus firms in financial industry (4,732) 
 22,644 
Minus firms with missing audit fee  (10,419) 
 12,225 
Minus firms with missing firm-specific control variables  (342) 
Final Sample 11,883 
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Table 3: Distribution of IFRS Adoption, 2005-2008 a 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria  67% 74% 86% 94% 
Belgium  71% 77% 80% 94% 
Denmark  63% 91% 91% 95% 
Finland  93% 100% 100% 100% 
France  59% 75% 79% 87% 
Germany  56% 66% 71% 81% 
Greece  97% 100% 100% 100% 
Ireland  47% 71% 94% 100% 
Italy  89% 99% 100% 100% 
Netherlands  93% 99% 99% 99% 
Portugal  88% 90% 93% 97% 
Spain  71% 76% 78% 77% 
Sweden  76% 86% 85% 89% 
UK  25% 51% 73% 99% 
 
a This table reports the percentage of firms that adopted IFRS for the period of 2005-2008 across 14 EU 
countries. The initial sample obtained from Worldscope database consists of 31,782 firm-year 
observations. We delete (1) firms with missing or ambiguous information on accounting standard 
information, (2) firms that adopted IFRS voluntarily (i.e., firms that adopted IFRS prior to 2005), (3) 
firms that pertain to the banking, insurance, and other financial industries (with the Worldscope general 
industry classification of 04, 05, or 06). The selection procedures result in 22,644 firm-year 
observations. 
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TABLE 4: Sample Characteristics a, b 
 
Country N 
AUD-FEE 
(mean) 
ABSEN- 
CE 
DIVERGEN-
CE 
Wingate 
Index 
LNTA  
(mean) 
INVREC  
(mean) 
LOSS  
(mean) 
LEV  
(mean) 
QUICK  
(mean) 
NBS  
(mean) 
NGS 
 (mean) 
BIG4  
(mean) 
CROSS 
 (mean) 
Austria 6 7.19 34 36 3.61 15.97 0.17 0.17 0.61 0.67 1.81  1.85  1.00 0.00 
Belgium 93 5.78 22 32 4.82 12.79 0.40 0.14 0.62 1.10 1.13  1.06  0.66 0.00 
Denmark 450 5.98 31 21 4.82 12.08 0.38 0.19 0.51 1.77 1.20  1.25  0.80 0.03 
Finland 251 6.20 22 31 3.61 12.89 0.34 0.16 0.52 1.25 1.49  1.52  0.86 0.06 
France 1216 6.77 21 34 6.22 13.12 0.37 0.20 0.61 1.55 0.90  1.02  0.52 0.06 
Germany 247 5.84 18 38 6.22 12.44 0.37 0.23 0.59 1.42 1.34  1.34  0.57 0.00 
Greece 4 3.65 40 28 3.61 12.17 0.02 1.00 0.25 0.50 1.39  0.69  1.00 0.00 
Ireland 277 5.76 0 34 6.22 12.40 0.25 0.27 0.59 2.62 1.07  1.19  0.87 0.11 
Italy 141 7.51 27 37 6.22 15.02 0.32 0.21 0.64 0.89 0.00  0.00  0.93 0.43 
Netherlands 105 7.62 10 25 6.22 14.06 0.34 0.13 2.98 0.93 1.39  1.41  0.96 0.00 
Portugal 98 5.99 29 22 3.61 13.79 0.25 0.17 0.68 0.75 1.39  1.05  0.83 0.00 
Spain 479 6.37 28 29 4.82 14.01 0.33 0.08 0.60 1.07 1.44  1.30  0.94 0.01 
Sweden 945 6.39 10 26 4.82 12.71 0.34 0.26 0.51 1.59 1.36  1.52  0.98 0.09 
UK 7,571 5.24 0 35 10 10.93 0.28 0.42 0.65 3.00 1.06  1.04  0.54 0.01 
               
Mean (total) (11,883) 5.66 6.94 33.17 8.32 11.69 0.31 0.34 0.64 2.46 1.10 1.11 0.62 0.03 
 
a The sample consists of 11,883 firm-year observations from 14 EU countries for the period of 2002-2008.  
b Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5: Correlations Matrix a, b  
 AUDFEE ADOPT POST_ADOPT LNTA INVREC LOSS LEV QUICK NBS NGS BIG4 CROSS 
ADOPT 0.29             
 <.0001            
POST_ADOPT 0.28  0.73            
 <.0001 <.0001           
LNTA 0.85  0.32  0.33           
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001          
INVREC 0.05  0.01  0.03  0.00          
 <.0001 0.15  0.00  0.74          
LOSS -0.34  -0.19  -0.18  -0.45  -0.21         
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001        
LEV -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.09  0.06  0.04        
 0.00  0.16  0.14  <.0001 <.0001 0.00        
QUICK -0.19  -0.06  -0.05  -0.17  -0.20  0.16  -0.03       
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.00       
NBS 0.39  0.08  0.09  0.39  0.07  -0.21  -0.01  -0.13      
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.25  <.0001     
NGS 0.40  0.10  0.10  0.35  0.07  -0.15  -0.02  -0.10  0.39     
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.01  <.0001 <.0001    
BIG4 0.47  0.14  0.16  0.52  0.01  -0.24  -0.02  -0.10  0.26  0.29    
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.33  <.0001 0.01  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
CROSS 0.15  0.04  0.05  0.16  -0.09  0.01  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.10   
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.26  0.43  0.12  0.15  0.03  <.0001  
REGIME -0.26  -0.28  -0.29  -0.37  -0.13  0.22  0.01  0.09  -0.15  -0.18  -0.27  -0.12  
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.48  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
a The sample consists of 11,883 firm-year observations from 14 EU countries for the period of 2002-2008.  
b Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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 TABLE 6 a, b, c 
Results of Multivariate Regressions for Testing H1 and H2 
AUDFEEijt = β0 + β1 ADOPTijt + β2 POST_ADOPTijt + δ1 LNTAijt + δ2 INVRECijt + δ3LOSSijt + δ4 LEVijt  
+ δ5 QUICKijt+ δ6 NBSijt + δ7 NGSijt + δ8 BIG4ijt + δ9 CROSSijt + Country Indicators + Error Term  
                                          
 Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -3.714  -4.96 
ADOPT (?) 0.139  8.97 
POST_ADOPT (-) -0.056  -3.49 
LNTA (+) 0.606  74.68 
INVREC (+) 0.419  6.39 
LOSS (+) 0.265  11.94 
LEV (+) 0.025  2.94 
QUICK (-) -0.008  -5.90 
NBS (+) 0.141  5.49 
NGS (+) 0.320  13.39 
BIG4 (+) 0.160  5.49 
CROSS (+) 0.109  1.13 
 
F-statistic 
 
0.083 
 
26.56 
 
Country Indicators 
 
Included 
Adj. R2 84.58% 
N 11,769 
 
a The initial sample consists of 11,883 firm-year observations from 14 countries for the period of 2002-2008. Refer 
to Table 1 for variable definitions.  
b Observations with absolute studentized residuals greater than 3 are deleted. The reported t-values are based on  
standard errors clustering on the firm dimension.  
c F-statistic is from a F-test of β1+β2=0. 
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TABLE 7 a, b 
Results of Multivariate Regressions for Testing H3, H4, and H5 
 
AUDFEEijt = β0 + β1 ADOPTjjt + β2 ADOPTijt*GAAPDIFFj + β3 ADOPTijt *ΔGAAPQUALITYj  
 + β4  ADOPTijt *REGIMEj+ δ1 LNTAijt + δ2 INVRECijt + δ3LOSSijt + δ4 LEVijt + δ5 QUICKijt 
 + δ6 NBSijt + δ7 NGSijt + δ8 BIG4ijt + δ9 CROSSijt + Country Indicators + Error Term 
 
 
 Column 1  Column 2 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -4.047  -5.34   -3.880  -5.09  
ADOPT (?)  -1.862  -2.60   -2.650  -2.56  
ADOPT * GAAPDIFF (+) 0.844  3.39   0.892  2.92  
ADOPT * ΔGAAPQUALITY (-) -0.201  -3.58   -0.244  -3.74  
ADOPT * REGIME (?) -0.445  -2.70     
ADOPT * REGIME2 (?)    0.023  0.17  
ADOPT * REGIME3 (?)    -0.044  -0.32  
ADOPT * REGIME4 (?)    -0.415  -2.44  
LNTA (+) 0.605  74.66   0.605  74.63  
INVREC (+) 0.419  6.39   0.418  6.38  
LOSS (+) 0.262  11.74   0.261  11.72  
LEV (+) 0.025  2.94   0.025  2.93  
QUICK (-) -0.008  -5.94   -0.008  -5.94  
NBS (+) 0.140  5.47   0.140  5.46  
NGS (+) 0.320  13.38   0.320  13.37  
BIG4 (+) 0.158  5.42   0.160  5.47  
CROSS (+) 0.122  1.25   0.122  1.26  
      
Country Indicators Included   Included 
Adj. R2 84.60%  84.60% 
N 11,765  11,765 
 
a The initial sample consists of 11,883 firm-year observations from 14 countries for the period of 2002-2008. Raw 
regime scores take four values in our sample: 3.61, 4.82, 6.22, 10. REGIME2=1 if raw legal regime score is 4.82, 
and 0 otherwise; REGIME3=1 if raw legal regime score=6.22, and 0 otherwise; REGIME4=1 if raw legal regime 
score=10, and 0 otherwise. Refer to Table 1 for other variable definitions.  
b Observations with absolute studentized residuals greater than 3 are deleted. The reported t-values are based on 
standard errors clustering on the firm dimension.  
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TABLE 8a, b 
Results of Multivariate Regressions for Testing H3, H4, and H5 
ΔAUDFEEij = β0 + β1GAAPDIFFj + β2 ΔGAAPQUALITYj + β3REGIMEj+ δ1ΔLNTAij + δ2 ΔINVRECij 
  + δ3ΔLOSSit + δ4 ΔLEVij + δ5 ΔQUICKit + Error Term 
 
 
 Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
 Coefficient t-statistics  Coefficient t-statistics  Coefficient t-statistics
Intercept 0.114  6.80   -1.592  -2.76   -2.361  -3.04  
GAAPDIFF (+)    0.809  4.11   0.840  3.61  
ΔGAAPQUALITY (-)    -0.229  -4.95   -0.247  -4.57  
REGIME (?)    -0.500  -3.77     
REGIME1 (?)       -0.077  -0.83  
REGIME2 (?)       -0.184  -1.89  
REGIME3 (?)       -0.494  -3.66  
ΔLNTA (+) 0.511  28.63   0.506  28.31   0.507  28.50  
ΔINVREC (+) 0.338  2.95   0.341  2.97   0.348  3.05  
ΔLOSS (+) 0.067  1.90   0.064  1.80   0.062  1.77  
ΔLEV (+) 0.027  7.59   0.027  7.54   0.027  7.61  
ΔQUICK (-) -0.010  -4.57   -0.010  -4.63   -0.010  -4.71  
         
Adj. R2 35.21%  35.78%  36.12% 
N 1,633  1,634  1,633 
 
a The initial sample consists of 1,648 firms from 14 countries for the period of 2002-2008, which have data both in 
the pre-IFRS period and the post-IFRS adoption period. The dependent variable is ΔAUDFEE. For each firm, we 
calculate the average value of audit fee (AUDFEE), total assets (LNTA), the sum of inventories and receivables 
divided by total assets (INVREC), leverage (LEV) and quick ratio (QUICK), separately for the pre-adoption period 
and the post-adoption period. Then we take the difference to construct the change measure. Since LOSS is an 
indicator variable, ΔLOSS takes value of 1 if, for a particular firm, the magnitude of loss in the post-adoption period 
is more than the magnitude of loss in the pre-adoption period. See Table 1 for variable definitions.  
b Observations with absolute studentized residuals greater than 3 are deleted. The reported t-values are based on 
standard errors clustering on the firm dimension.   
 
 
 
 
